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Abstract
We examine the potential welfare gains and channels of income smoothing for Pacific
Island Countries (PICs) and find that, under full risk sharing overall welfare gains across all
PICs (particularly, Kiribati, Palau, and Papua New Guinea) are at desirable levels. How-
ever, for Australia, the potential welfare gain from risk sharing is almost similar to the
gain it obtains if Australia attains full risk sharing with the rest of the OECD countries or
with New Zealand alone. We also break down output using the framework of Sørensen and
Yosha (1998) to quantify the extent and channels of risk sharing across PICs. For PICs,
income-smoothing channels (net factor income and current transfers) play a significant role
in buffering the output shock compared to the performance of those channels on smoothing
the output shock for OECD countries. Domestic savings also smooth a fair portion of shocks
to output, but the extent is much lower compared to that of OECD countries. Further, we
analyze the effect of remittances and foreign aid on income smoothing for the PICs exclud-
ing Australia and New Zealand. Income smoothing via remittances is highly volatile and
significant in recent years, while foreign aid seems to be a stronger and more stable channel
for smoothing domestic output shocks for PICs.
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1 Introduction
Throughout the world, economic unions are becoming more important in promoting economic
growth and welfare. Following the European Union (EU), the emerging markets of Eastern Asia,
the oil-rich Middle East economies and others have formed (or aiming to form) economic (and
monetary) unions to promote economic growth and welfare gains from each other.1 The eco-
nomic (and monetary) unions are often motivated to be formed by both developed and emerging
economies -expansion of the EU to include Central and Eastern Europe is a good example- even
though emerging market economies with a history of relatively high macroeconomic volatility
may raise concerns for economic integration.
Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have so far only created a forum rather than an economic
union. They are debating whether to harmonize and unify social, fiscal, and monetary poli-
cies -i.e. to form an economic union- in the future.2 Several researchers suggested that the
PICs region should move beyond the initiatives already in place by adopting a common cur-
rency, emphasizing its potential to enhance macroeconomic stability and further to increase
trade flows between member countries. However, PICs have faced considerable challenges aris-
ing from the small size of their economies, and therefore vulnerability to shocks, as well as
from limited policy flexibility, and variable economic performance. In a detailed study, Browne
and Orsmond (2006) indicated that the adopting a common currency among PICs would re-
quire a substantial strengthening of domestic and regional policies that would take time to
achieve. There is also no consensus that PICs should adopt a currency union. For example, De
Brouwer (2000) and Duncan (2002) supported the idea that PICs should form a monetary union
adopting the Australian dollar; on the other hand, Hughes (2003) and Fichera (2006) advised
against any form of monetary union in the Pacific prior to unifying fiscal and monetary poli-
cies. A number of studies, including Bunyaratavej and Jayaraman (2005), and Bowman (2005)
maintained that it is still too early for PICs to form a currency union, given the dissimilarities
in their macroeconomic policies and key measures such as inflation and exchange rates, but the
asymmetries of the output shocks encourage the policy holders to support the currency union.
We contribute to the existing literature first estimating the potential gains from economic
integration for the countries in the PICs region. Particularly we define integration as the degree
to which a country’s consumption is independent from country-specific output shocks (risk
sharing). Full risk sharing is defined as the case in which all country-specific output shocks
(changes in terms of trade, fluctuations in production, policy reforms, natural disasters etc.)
are completely diversified and the output volatility of an individual country is not reflected
on its consumption. We measure each country’s potential welfare gains in the case of full risk
sharing, compared to the autarky position and show that when the PICs move towards full risk
sharing, all (or some) of them will gain from diversifying country-specific risks. The advantages
of integration are often questioned because of the recent financial crises and instability in a
number of the emerging markets (see Rodrik (1998) and Stiglitz (2002)). While excessive
output volatility is undesirable for any economy, the inability of individual members of an
economic union to reduce the impact of adverse output shocks by monetary and exchange
rate policy instruments is a major concern for the members. Even though the adverse supply
shocks among members in the union lead to difficulties in having stable instruments, the full
capital mobility version of the optimum currency area concept by Mundell (1973) states that
1Central and West African Monetary unions are also followers of the EU. The East African Community, the
Caribbean Single Market and Economy, and the Union of South American Nations are other economic unions,
that are scheduled to be formed in the near future.
2The Pacific Islands Forum, founded in 1971, is a political grouping of 16 independent and self-governing
states which aims to enhance cooperation between the member countries and represent their interests. The
forum includes Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand,
Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and
Vanuatu.
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macroeconomic asymmetry does not preclude countries from forming economic and currency
unions as long as they effectively share their output risks.3 Clearly, policy makers should take
into account the risk sharing opportunities that integration brings.
As we pointed out earlier, full risk sharing between countries in an economic (monetary)
union can increase welfare.4 However, even among the European Monetary Union (EMU)
members, the total risk sharing is well below the full risk sharing.5 At this stage, policy
makers may consider taking various actions such as promoting trade in international goods,
financial assets, labor movements, and foreign aid to attain full risk sharing among countries.
There are different ways that countries can achieve risk sharing, which we refer to as the
channels of risk sharing. The main channels are cross-border ownership of assets which “smooth”
income (making income growth in a country less sensitive to output growth), international
transfers (remittances and foreign aid) which smooth disposable income for a given income,
and borrowing and lending which smooth consumption for a given level of disposable income.
Asdrubali et al. (1996) (ASY) derived a simple way of quantifying the relative contributions of
various channels of income and consumption smoothing within a common framework. They find
that both capital and credit market institutions provide the bulk of risk sharing through income
smoothing across the states in the US. Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Balli and Sørensen (2007)
used similar methods to evaluate channels of risk sharing among countries in the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).6
Second, we estimate various risk sharing channels for PICs to reveal the current state of
risk sharing employing the methodologies of ASY and Sørensen and Yosha (1998). In addition
to the typical channels of risk sharing, we decompose the magnitude of income smoothing via
international transfers as remittance inflows and foreign aid, and find that the magnitudes of
these channels are significant in smoothing some portion of the domestic output shocks. To the
best of our knowledge, our approach of measuring income smoothing via remittance inflows and
foreign aid is the first in the literature.
Our results can be summarized as follows: for the less developed PICs (i.e. PICs not
including Australia and New Zealand), the potential welfare gains from full risk sharing are
higher than those achieved by OECD members under full risk sharing. For New Zealand, the
welfare gains are higher compared to the welfare gains New Zealand obtains by attaining full
risk sharing with the OECD members or attaining full risk sharing with Australia only. For
Australia, the gains from full risk sharing with other PICs is at the same level as the potential
gains of full risk sharing if Australia attains full risk sharing with the OECD members.
Considering the channels of risk sharing, smoothing via net factor income flows plays a
significant role in risk sharing among less developed PICs. This channel is mostly driven by
the short term labor income inflows; i.e. net compensation of employees from the rest of the
world.7 International transfers, particularly remittance inflows in recent years and foreign aid,
smooth significant percentage of output shocks across the less developed PICs. This channel is
not strong enough among OECD members to buffer the output shocks. The reason might be
3The OCA concept by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) suggest that the lack of independent monetary
policy may lead to a significant loss of welfare and even breakdown of monetary union and the union members
may exhibit non-synchronized (or asymmetric) output fluctuations if international capital mobility is limited.
4Specifically, full risk sharing is the situation where consumption grows at identical rates in all countries.
We refer to the growth rate of a country-level variable minus the union-wide counterpart as the “idiosyncratic”
growth rate. We consider risk sharing to be higher the less idiosyncratic consumption growth co-varies with
idiosyncratic income growth.
5Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that total risk sharing is around 70-80% for the US. Basher et al. (2009) also find
a similar magnitude of total risk sharing for Canada while for the EU, Balli and Sørensen (2007) calculate it to
be below 50%.
6Soyoung et al. (2006) and Kim and Sheen (2007) employ the same methodology and measure the channels
of risk sharing for Eastern Asian countries, Australia, and New Zealand, respectively.
7Compensation of employees -what the IMF’s Balance of Payments termed labor income until 1995- are funds
transferred to countries of origin by nationals who have been abroad for fewer than 12 months.
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that the amount of the remittance inflows and foreign aid to the OECD region is much lower
compared to PICs or other low income countries. Lastly, because of the ineffectiveness of the
credit markets, the savings channel -although this corresponds to a fair portion of the total risk
sharing for PICs- is able to smooth a smaller amount of domestic output shocks compared to
OECD countries.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We employ a broad annual dataset to measure the channels of risk sharing and to calculate
the potential welfare gains from risk sharing for PICs for the years 1981 to 2007.8 National
accounts data, i.e. gross domestic product (GDP), gross national income (GNI), net national
income (NNI), disposable national income (DNI), and government (G) and private consump-
tions (C), are all obtained from the United Nations (UN) National Accounts Statistics: Main
Aggregates and Detailed Tables. Population and exchange rates are also obtained from the
UN National Accounts Database. The consumer price index (CPI) of each country is obtained
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database. For OECD members, the national
accounts data are taken from the OECD National Accounts, Main Aggregates (Volume I) and
Detailed Tables (Volume II). The OECD countries in our sample consist of all OECD members
except Luxembourg, Iceland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia,
and Turkey.9 Remittances (in US dollars) are obtained from the World Bank’s Migration
and Development Brief, prepared by the Migration and Remittances Team and Development
Prospects Group. Foreign aid data is obtained from World Bank’s Development Indicators
Database (WDI). By dividing each national account unit (e.g. GDP) by the country’s popu-
lation, and by deflating with each country’s CPI, we transform the series into real per capita
terms.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for real GDP and real consumption per capita growth
rates of individual countries for the 1981–2007 period. The first two columns report the mean
and standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth rates. Overall, the annual growth rate
for PICs averages 0.36%. The rate drops to 0.26% when we exclude Australia and New Zealand.
The standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth for PICs is 3.84% and it is at a similar
level when we exclude Australia and New Zealand. The third and fourth columns show the mean
and standard deviation of real consumption per capita growth rates. Consumption growth rates
are higher than GDP growth rates for PICs. The average consumption per capita growth rate is
0.85%, which is 2.5 times that of the GDP per capita growth rate. When we exclude Australia
and New Zealand, the consumption growth rate is still very high and at 0.83%. It is more likely
that international transfers (remittances and foreign aid) are injected to the less developed
PICs, promoting more consumption growth than the GDP growth for the less developed PICs.
The last two columns report the correlations of each country’s output and consumption growth
rate with the aggregate PICs output and consumption growth rates. The correlations of output
are larger than those of consumption, which is consistent with the international consumption
correlation puzzle documented by Backus et al. (1992).
8PICs include Australia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, New Caledonia, New
Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Cook Islands and Talau are
excluded because of insufficient data. In analyzing the channels of risk sharing, a few more countries are excluded
because of missing observations.
9We exclude these countries due to various reasons. Luxembourg is very small and atypical, Iceland has
incomplete data and the rest of the excluded countries are less developed part of all members.
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3 Potential Welfare Gains From Risk Sharing
Welfare gains are indeed achieved when countries perfectly diversify their idiosyncratic output
shocks and smooth out their consumption. Economists have attempted to measure the potential
welfare gains from consumption risk sharing by comparing the level of welfare gains of a complete
market economy (full risk sharing) with the incomplete market (autarky) economy. In this
section, we follow Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) to estimate the potential welfare gains of each
PICs member if they attain full risk sharing with other countries in the region.
The main assumption of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) is a closed form expression that can
be derived for the welfare gains that are achieved by moving from financial autarky to full risk
sharing. To calculate the potential welfare gains from risk sharing, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001)
compare the expected utility of consuming each country’s own per capita output (autarky)
with that of consuming the country-specific portion of aggregate output under full risk sharing
within a groups of economies. The difference between the utilities is called the potential welfare
gain from risk sharing. The gains are expressed as the permanent increase in the level of each
country’s consumption.10
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) formulate the gains for logarithmic utility (a special case for
CRRA utility) as:11
Gi = 100 ∗ 1
δ
(
1
2
σ2 +
1
2
(σi)2 − covi). (1)
We use Gi as Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001)’s measure of the potential gains from risk sharing
for country i. δ is the intertemporal discount rate.12 σ2 is the variance of the group-wide
per capita GDP growth rate, (σi)2 is the variance of country i ’s per capita GDP growth rate,
and covi is the covariance of the country i ’s GDP per capita with the group-wide GDP per
capita. The equation can be interpreted as follows: higher gains are attained with a lower
covariance since countries with asymmetric output growth are certainly being compensated in
the risk sharing agreement to provide insurance for other countries by stabilizing aggregate
output growth. Similarly, a country with a higher variance of output will benefit more from
sharing risk with other countries. The higher the variance of the aggregate group-wide output,
the more other countries would be willing to “pay” to country i for joining the risk sharing
arrangement because it provides additional diversification opportunities for all.
Table 2 reports the potential welfare gains that each PIC member is able to attain if full
risk sharing exists within the region. The potential gains for smaller PICs economies (Kiribati,
Palau, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Vanuatu) are in higher percentages. Even rela-
tively bigger PIC economies (Fiji and Papua New Guinea) have higher potential welfare gains
compared to the potential gains of OECD countries. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) estimated
that, on average, OECD members’ gains from risk sharing are less than 1% when OECD mem-
bers attain full risk sharing with each other.13 Relatively large welfare gains for the PICs are
primarily driven by the high volatility of output and consumption (see Table 1), particularly
for Kiribati, Palau, and Papua New Guinea. Countries with the highest level variance and a
counter-cyclical pattern of output growth would contribute most greatly towards stabilizing ag-
gregate consumption in the region.14 We also find that for New Zealand, the welfare gain from
10Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) derived utility gain measurement from the general Constant Relative Risk Aver-
sion (CRRA) utility function of U(c) = c
(1−γ)
(1−γ) , (γ 6= 1) where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
11The derivation of the formula can be found in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) pages 130–135.
12Generally, previous studies including Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001), employed δ in the range of 0.02 to 0.04.
13Recently, Demyank and Volosovych (2008), by employing the same methodology, find that EU members
gain 0.69% on average from full risk sharing for the period of 1994–2005, whereas new EU members (members
accepted after 2004) gain around 3% from full risk sharing over the same period.
14The higher correlation of GDP growth rates of each OECD country with OECD-wide GDP growth rates(see
Demyank and Volosovych (2008)) forces the potential of welfare gains across OECD to be relatively smaller.
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full risk sharing with other PICs is in a higher percentage than OECD averages. Our finding for
New Zealand is similar to the findings of Kim and Sheen (2007) who indicate that the welfare
gain is higher when Australia and New Zealand have full risk sharing with each other than when
Australia and New Zealand have full risk sharing with other OECD members. For Australia,
the welfare gains from full risk sharing with other PICs members is relatively lower and it is
similar to the percentage of welfare gain Australia obtains when it has full risk sharing with the
rest of the OECD members or with New Zealand alone.15 These findings would not motivate
Australia, unlike New Zealand, to seek full risk sharing with the other PICs.
4 Full Risk Sharing and Perfect Consumption Smoothing
The basic theory of international risk sharing is well known—see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)—
and we only outline the basic ideas for endowment economies with one homogeneous tradable
good. Period t per capita output of country i is an exogenous random variable with a commonly
known probability distribution. The representative consumer of each country is a risk averse
expected utility maximizer.16 Consumers within each country are identical with Constant Rel-
ative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions and perfect Arrow-Debreu markets for contingent
claims. Optimal consumption then satisfies the full risk sharing relation when the consumption
of a country co-moves with world consumption but not with country specific shocks.
A testable implication is that consumption growth rates are identical for all countries, i.e.
∆ log cit = α +β∆ log c
w
t + 
i
t, where α is a constant and 
i
t is an error term—due to either taste
shocks or noise. After controlling for aggregate consumption growth (∆ log cwt ), the consumption
growth rate of a country (∆ log cit) should not be a function of the output growth of that country.
Regression-based tests for full risk sharing at the country level are conducted by Obstfeld (1994),
Canova and Ravn (1996), and Lewis (1996)(see Lewis (1995) for a comprehensive survey of these
literature).17
It is of more interest to quantify the extent of risk sharing between countries rather than
to test the abstract ideal of perfect risk sharing. It is also interesting to identify the exact
channels through which risk is shared and to quantify the amount of risk sharing obtained via
each channel. ASY and Sørensen and Yosha (1998) developed a method for answering these
questions. In the next section, we explain their methodology in detail.
4.1 Channels of income and consumption smoothing
There are several mechanisms for sharing risk. The most straightforward way of sharing risk
internationally is through international income diversification; i.e. through cross-border own-
ership of productive assets. Net income from cross-border ownership of productive assets (net
factor income) is reflected in the National Accounts data as the difference between GDP and
GNI. If risk is not fully shared through net factor income flows, other channels for smoothing
consumption are possible. The second channel, depreciation, is the difference between GNI and
NNI. When depreciation does not vary one-to-one with GDP, then there is a room for income
smoothing via depreciation. This channel of risk sharing is not very interesting but it needs to
be included if we want to consider all “wedges” between GDP and consumption. NNI can be
15See Kim and Sheen (2007) for calculations of welfare gains of Australia obtains when it has full risk sharing
with the rest of the OECD members or with New Zealand alone.
16We do not consider non-separabilities in the utility function between consumption and leisure or non-tradable
output. See Canova and Ravn (1996) and Lewis (1996) for a treatment of these issues in the context of interna-
tional risk sharing.
17Full risk sharing tests, using individual-level data are first performed by Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991) and
Townsend (1994). International Real Business Cycle studies, most notably Backus et al. (1992), Baxter and
Crucini (1995), and Stockman and Tesar (1995) examine the prediction that the correlation of consumption
across countries should be equal to unity. The data are, however, far from confirming that prediction.
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smoothed through international transfers which are the differences between NNI and Disposable
National Income (DNI)). The last channel is saving which is the difference between DNI and
consumption. Consumption can be smoothed through pro-cyclical saving behavior Individuals
save and dis-save in order to smooth consumption inter-temporally.
The variance decomposition described below allows us to measure both the fraction of shocks
to GDP that are smoothed through net factor income flows, depreciation, international transfers,
and saving and the fraction of shocks that are not smoothed.
4.2 Decomposing the cross-sectional variance of shocks to GDP
Consider the identity, holding for any period t:
GDP
i =
GDPi
GNIi
GNIi
NNIi
NNIi
DNIi
DNIi
(Ci + Gi)
(Ci + Gi), (2)
where all the magnitudes are in per capita terms, and i is the country index. The time index is
suppressed to stress the cross-sectional nature of the derivation.
Taking logs and differences on both sides of (2), multiply both sides by ∆ logGDPi (minus
its mean) and taking the cross-sectional average, we obtain the variance decomposition:
var{∆ logGDPi} = cov{∆ logGDPi −∆ logGNIi,∆ logGDPi}
+ cov{∆ logGNIi −∆ log NNIi,∆ logGDPi}
+ cov{∆ log NNIi −∆ log DNIi,∆ logGDPi}
+ cov{∆ log DNIi −∆ log(Ci + Gi),∆ logGDPi}
+ cov{∆ log(Ci + Gi),∆ logGDPi} .
In this equation, “var { X }” and “cov { X,Y }” denote the statistics 1N
∑N
i=1(X
i − X¯)2 and
1
N
∑N
i=1(X
i − X¯)(Yi − Y¯), respectively, where N is the number of countries in the sample.
Dividing by var{∆ logGDPi}, we get 1 = βf + βd + βτ + βs + βu, where, for example:
βf =
cov{∆ logGDPi −∆ logGNIi,∆ logGDPi}
var{∆ logGDPi} (3)
is the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional regression of ∆ logGDPi−
∆ logGNIi on ∆ logGDPi, and similarly for βd, βτ , and βs. The coefficients βf , βd, βτ , and βs
are interpreted as the fraction of shocks absorbed through factor income flows, depreciation,
international transfers, and saving, respectively. The last coefficient in the decomposition is
given by:
βu =
cov{∆ log(Ci + Gi),∆ logGDPi}
var{∆ logGDPi} , (4)
which is the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional regression of
∆ log(Ci + Gi) on ∆ logGDPi. βu is the fraction of shocks to GDP that are not smoothed.
If there is full risk sharing, then cov{∆ log(Ci+Gi),∆ logGDPi} = 0 and hence βu = 0. If full
risk sharing is not achieved, then consumption in country i varies positively with idiosyncratic
shocks to country i’s output, and βu > 0. A cross-sectional regression of consumption on output,
controlling for fluctuations in world consumption, is therefore a test of full risk sharing.18
If full risk sharing is achieved through income smoothing via factor income flows, then
cov{∆ logGNIi,∆ logGDPi} = 0 and cov{∆ logGDPi−∆ logGNIi,∆ logGDPi} = var{∆ logGDPi},
18This is the test suggested by Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994), who tested for full risk sharing by running
cross-sectional (or panel) regressions of consumption on income, controlling for aggregate movements in income
and consumption.
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implying βf = 1.
19 Moreover, in this case, since consumers in each country consume their GNI,
Ci + Gi = GNIi, implying that βu = 0.
Suppose that full risk sharing is achieved through the combination of factor income flows,
depreciation, and international transfers, then by similar reasoning, βf + βd + βτ = 1 and since
consumers in each country will consume their DNI, βu = 0. Similarly, if full risk sharing is
achieved through factor income flows, depreciation, international transfers, and saving, then
βf +βd+βτ +βs = 1 and βu = 0. If consumption is perfectly smoothed, βf , βd, βτ , and βs sum
to unity and βu = 0. Otherwise, they sum to less than unity. In either case, these coefficients
reflect the incremental amount of smoothing achieved through these various channels.
We do not impose any restrictions on the sign of the β-coefficients. If a country is hit by
a positive shock and say, capital consumption increased more than the increase in the output,
then the estimated coefficient, βd, is negative i.e, depreciation channel provides dis-smoothing.
4.3 Estimation of channels of risk sharing
Empirically, the following (panel) equations are estimated:
∆ logGDPit −∆ logGNIit = νf,t + βf ∆ logGDPit + if,t ,
∆ logGNIit −∆ log NNIit = νd,t + βd ∆ logGDPit + id,t ,
∆ log NNIit −∆ log DNIit = ντ,t + βτ ∆ logGDPit + iτ,t ,
∆ log DNIit −∆ log(Cit + Git) = νs,t + βs ∆ logGDPit + is,t ,
∆ log(Cit + G
i
t) = νu,t + βu ∆ logGDP
i
t + 
i
u,t , (5)
where ν·,t are time fixed effects. The time fixed effects capture year-specific impacts on growth
rates, most notably the impact of the growth on aggregate output. Furthermore, with time
fixed effects, the β-coefficients captures the weighted averages of the year-by-year cross-sectional
regressions. To account for autocorrelation in the residuals, we assume that the error terms in
each equation and in each country follow an AR(1) process. We assume that the autocorrelation
parameter is identical across countries and equations as the samples are short.20
Allowing for state-specific variances for the error terms, we estimate the simultaneous sys-
tem (5) by a two-step Generalized Least Squares (GLS) procedure. First, we use least squares,
then use the residuals to estimate the weights. Second, weighted least squares is performed us-
ing the estimated weights. The Prais-Winsten transformation is used to take care of the serial
correlation of the variables. We use differenced data at annual frequency. Since our method is
based on panel estimations with time fixed effects, it yields fully consistent estimates even if
worldwide taste shocks occur.
4.4 Income and consumption smoothing
Table 3 displays the estimated percentages of GDP shocks smoothed through each channel
for PICs. The upper panel contains estimations including Australia and New Zealand in the
sample, and the lower panel contains the estimations excluding Australia and New Zealand
in the sample.21 In order to make comparisons, we also estimate the channels of income and
consumption smoothing for OECD members, and present the results in Table 4. Conceptually,
the coefficients add up to 100% but we choose not to impose this constraint.22 The first rows in
19If not, cov{∆ log GNIi,∆ log GDPi} > 0 and hence, βf < 1.
20Following Pesaran (2004) we test cross-section dependence and show that cross-section independence occurs.
21Due to the large number of missing observations we dropped some Pacific Island Countries to pursue the
estimations.
22Due to the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the sum of the coefficients may not be equal to 100%.
However our calculations show that even though we do not impose this restriction, the sum of the coefficients
are pretty close to 100%.
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both the upper and lower panels of Table 3 display the percentage of output shocks smoothed
by the factor income inflows for PICs. In the lower panel, factor income flows have a positive
and significant contribution of 6% to 8% to risk sharing. Net factor income is decomposed of net
income from net financial assets (equity, bond, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) earnings),
net compensation of employees from the rest of the world, and net tax on imports. It is known
that the volume of the cross-border asset holdings of the less developed PICs is relatively lower
compared to that of developed countries such as OECD members or EU members. Therefore,
one can not expect that risk sharing via net factor income channel is driven by income from
financial assets. However, income from non-resident (seasonal) laborers working abroad (net
compensation of employees from rest of the world) is the crucial factor behind the positive
and significant level of factor income smoothing. Indeed, net compensation of employees from
the rest of the world is a remarkable inflow to the less developed PICs economies. According
to the UN National Accounts Detailed Aggregates Database for the years between 1980–2007,
Fiji’s inflow of compensation of employees from the rest of the world is 3% of its GDP, on
average. Similarly, Kiribati has 3%, Papua New Guinea 3%, Tonga 2.5%, and Vanuatu 2.5%.
These amounts are highly remarkable compared to Australia and New Zealand, where the net
compensation of employees from the rest of the world is only 0.2% and 0.4% of their GDP,
respectively. For OECD members, the smoothing via factor income is very limited until 2000s
according to Table 4. However because of the substantial decline in portfolio home bias, net
factor income flow is, after all, able to smooth a portion of domestic output shocks. The
estimated percentage of GDP shocks smoothed by factor income flow is positive and significant
(6%) for the period 2001–2007 only.23 Another component of net factor income flows, net
compensation of employees from the rest of the world, is not a driven factor for the net factor
income flows for OECD members. Because, at average between 1990 and 2007, the ratio of the
net compensation of employees from the rest of the world to GDP is 0.1% for OECD members.
Overall, in both tables, smoothing via net factor income channel is significant but the driving
sub-channels are different.
The second rows in Tables 3 and 4 display the estimated percentages of GDP shocks
smoothed via depreciation. The depreciation channel is not very interesting as it is a func-
tion of past investment and besides, it is mainly imputed. However, the negative sign can be
relatively more intuitive as depreciation typically does not move with output and therefore a
larger share of output is available for income and consumption. Unlike OECD members, for
PICs without Australia and New Zealand, it is highly volatile in every decade. We may consider
that massive ongoing construction works taking place in urban areas and the destruction of old
buildings for the sake of having newer buildings might be a reason for high volatility in this
channel.
The third rows in Tables 3 and 4 display the estimated percentages of GDP shocks smoothed
via international transfers. International transfers include workers’ remittances and official
transfers, such as contributions to foreign aid. Table 3 shows that the international transfers
channel is highly significant in the lower panel, which highlights the importance of international
transfers for the less developed PICs in smoothing the output shocks. In average, years between
1981 and 2007, around 9% of output shocks has been buffered by international transfers. For
OECD members, smoothing via international transfers is insignificant, which is not surprising
since the level of remittance inflows and foreign aid inflows are smaller in magnitude and are
not able to smooth the shocks across OECD sample. In the next section, we go one step further
and decompose the international transfers channel by measuring the effects of the remittance
transfers and foreign aid on smoothing domestic output shocks, one by one across PICs.
The fourth rows in Tables 3 and 4 report the percentages of output shocks smoothed via
savings. Both panels indicate that bulk of total smoothing is achieved via savings. However,
23Sørensen et al. (2007) and Balli and Sørensen (2007) find that the capital market integration among high
income OECD members allowed significant magnitudes of income smoothing to be via net factor income flows.
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in the upper panel of Table 3, we show that the percentage of domestic output smoothed by
savings is 40% on average, whereas it is 26% for the less developed PICs. Since Australia and
New Zealand have well developed credit markets, there is a remarkable difference in smoothing
output shocks via savings. For the OECD members, the output shocks smoothed via savings
is 58% on average for the period of 1981–2007. Comparing percentage of domestic shocks via
savings for OECD members with the PICs counterpart, policy makers are able to observe the
importance of the credit markets in consumption smoothing, even other income channels-factor
income flow or international transfers- are not“strong enough.”
Even though for PICs, the total smoothing is mostly driven by the savings channel, the
magnitude of this channel is lower compared to OECD. Unlike the OECD countries, the factor
income and international transfers channels are significant and smooth a greater percentage of
shocks for the less developed PICs. Relatively higher amounts of remittance transfers (and net
compensation of employees from abroad) from immigrants and foreign aid inflows are the main
reasons for this finding.
4.5 Income Smoothing Via Remittance Inflows and Foreign Aid
Many studies have investigated the effects of foreign aid and remittance transfers on eco-
nomic growth for the PICS, including Knapman (1986), Gounder (2001), Jayaraman and
Choong (2006), Pavlov and Craig (2006), Rao and Takuria (2006), and Rao et al. (2007).
However, these studies are silent on measuring the extent to which remittances and foreign aid
smooth domestic output shocks and stabilize per capita consumption.24 The less developed
PICs have been growing faster than the world average, and the real GDP per capita levels of
these countries are still behind those of Australia and New Zealand. Both transfers through
non-immigrants and immigrants living abroad and foreign aid from international institutions
and governments are important injections into these economies. Indeed, an analysis of how
much of domestic shocks are smoothed via these injections is important for policy makers.
Regarding on the amount of remittances in the PICs, Ratha et al. (2009) document that
the remittance inflows to the less developed PICs were around 2 billion US dollars in 2008. For
instance, in 2008, while Tonga has a remittance inflows of 37% of its GDP, Samoa has 26%.
Considering the larger economies, such as Fiji and Papua New Guinea, the remittance inflows
are 7% and 3% of their GDP, respectively. Australia has remittance inflows of only 0.4% of its
GDP, whereas New Zealand has 0.5%.25
According to World Development Indicators (WDI), the foreign aid inflows are at remarkable
levels for the less developed PICs as well. Between the years 1980 and 2007, Fiji has a foreign
aid inflows of 24% of its GDP on average whereas Papua New Guinea has 10%. For smaller
economies, foreign aid inflows is much higher. For example, Kiribati has foreign aid inflows of
50% of its GDP; whereas Palau has 47%, Samoa has 21%, Tonga has 20%, and Vanuatu has
17%.
Remittances smooth domestic output shocks when remittances and domestic economy move
counter-cyclically. In other words, remittances are able to buffer domestic shocks when migrants
send more money back home when the domestic economy is in recession and vice-versa. In order
to measure the percentage of output shock smoothed via remittance inflows, we estimate the
following equation:
∆ logGDPit −∆ log(GDPit + NET REMITTANCESit) = νr,t + βr ∆ logGDPit + ir,t , (6)
24Not many studies address the effect of remittances and financial aid on smoothing domestic output shocks.
Sayan (2006) studied whether or not remittances have a tendency to move counter-cyclical with GDP in recipient
countries.
25High income OECD countries has a remittance inflows of 0.2% of their GDP on average for 2008.
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where “NET REMITTANCESit” is remittance inflows for country i at time t and νr,t is a time
fixed effect. As we noted earlier, the time fixed effects capture year-specific impacts on growth
rates, most notably the impact of the growth on aggregate output. The regression examines
if output plus remittance inflows (which can be considered as “income” available before other
channels of risk sharing) varies less (more) than one-to-one with output. If that is the case,
positive (negative or dis-smoothing) risk sharing from remittance inflows is achieved. The
estimated coefficient, βr, is our measure of such risk sharing via remittance inflows.
Similarly, we obtain income smoothing via foreign aids from the rest of the world with the
following equation:
∆ logGDPit −∆ log(GDPit + FOREIGN AIDit) = νa,t + βa ∆ logGDPit + ia,t , (7)
where “FOREIGN AIDit” is foreign aid inflows from abroad for country i at time t and νa,t is
a time fixed effect. Similarly, the regression examines if output plus foreign aid (which can be
considered as “income” available before other channels of risk sharing) varies less (or more) than
one-to-one with output. If that is the case, positive (negative or dis-smoothing) risk sharing
from foreign aid inflows is achieved. The estimated coefficient, βa, is our measure of such risk
sharing via foreign aid inflows.
Table 5 displays the percentage of shocks smoothed via remittance inflows and foreign aid
from other governments and foreign institutions. The last columns contain the regression com-
ponents for the entire sample. We observe that for the entire period, the foreign aid channel
smooths domestic output shocks to some extent, whereas income smoothing via remittances is
insignificant. By looking at sub-samples, we realize that smoothing via remittances is highly
volatile. Between 1987 and 2000, income smoothing via remittance inflows was negative and
significant, whereas, from 2000 onwards, 19% of domestic shocks were absorbed by the remit-
tances. On the other hand, the results for the entire sample demonstrate that the percentage
of shocks smoothed via foreign aid is 13% and significant. Even though smoothing via foreign
aid is higher and at significant levels before 2000, it decreases over the recent years.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the results discussed so far in a graphical form. The dotted
line corresponds to the income smoothing via remittances and the solid line corresponds to
smoothing via foreign aid. We observe that smoothing via remittances is highly volatile. Until
2000, it is negative then it becomes positive meaning after 2000 remittances starts to play a
role in smoothing output shocks. Unlike remittances, smoothing via foreign aid is less volatile
and it declines in recent years.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine the potential welfare gains and channels of income smoothing for
PICs. We find that the overall welfare gains across all PICs (particularly Kiribati, Palau, and
Papua New Guinea) are higher than the potential gains for OECD countries under the full risk
sharing. For the developed PICs, New Zealand would have a higher gain from full risk sharing
with the rest of the PICs, compared to the potential welfare gains if New Zealand attained full
risk sharing with other OECD members. However, for Australia, the potential welfare gains
from full risk sharing with other PICs are almost similar to the gains obtained if Australia
attained full risk sharing with the rest of the OECD countries or with New Zealand alone.
Given that Australia is the biggest country (both economically and demographically) in the
region, and the motivation of Australia for achieving full risk sharing is not as strong as that
of other countries in the region, the possibility of attaining perfect market integration does not
seem plausible in the near future.
In quantifying the extent and channels of risk sharing across the PICs, we find that net
factor income flows and net transfers channels smooth an important portion of the output
shocks, compared to OECD members. We indicate that the net factor income channel of PICs
11
is driven by the net compensation of employees from the rest of the world. For OECD members,
significant smoothing via net factor income is driven by income flows from the foreign financial
asset holdings. Domestic savings smooth the bulk of output shocks for PICs, but the percentage
of the shocks absorbed via savings is lower -much lower for the less developed PICs- compared
to the OECD counterpart. Further, we analyze the effect of remittances and foreign aid on
income smoothing for the less developed PICs. We find that smoothing via remittances is
highly volatile and significant in recent years, whereas foreign aid seems to be a stronger and
more stable channel for smoothing the domestic output shocks for PICs.
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Figure 1: Income Smoothing via Foreign Aid and Net Remittances for PICs without A&NZ
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Risk Sharing is estimated year by year and smoothed using a Kernel with a bandwidth (standard deviation equal to 2) for
PIC countries (Fiji, Kiribati, Palau, Papau New Guniea, Samoa,Tonga, Vanuatu). Financial Aid data is obtained from World
Bank Development Indicators (WDI). Remittance data is obtained from World Bank's Migration and Development Brief
2009, prepared by Migration and Remittances Team, Development Prospects Group, and World Bank .
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Pacific Island Countries
∆GDP ∆C ∆GDP ∆C
Mean StD Mean StD Correlation Correlation
Australia 0.77 3.77 0.79 3.83 0.99 0.99
Fiji 0.31 4.80 1.29 7.69 0.80 0.78
French Polynesia 0.79 4.05 2.28 5.48 0.64 0.51
Kiribati 0.41 6.02 1.28 7.13 0.71 0.70
Marshall Islands 0.05 1.97 –0.08 2.24 0.46 0.42
Micronesia 0.31 1.55 0.15 1.55 0.27 0.19
New Caledonia 0.48 4.24 0.84 5.21 0.69 0.55
New Zealand 1.20 5.19 1.22 5.24 0.94 0.91
Palau 0.20 6.02 –0.17 10.60 0.67 0.41
Papua New Guinea –0.35 6.86 -0.11 7.56 0.76 0.71
Samoa 0.28 3.13 0.52 5.04 0.84 0.53
Solomon Islands –0.21 4.47 0.11 5.26 0.63 0.79
Tonga 0.24 3.22 0.43 4.57 0.86 0.58
Vanuatu 0.95 3.45 1.04 4.12 0.76 0.79
Average 0.36 3.84 0.85 5.40 0.72 0.62
Average w/o A&NZ 0.26 3.71 0.83 5.45 0.67 0.56
Notes: Sample: 1981–2007. ∆GDP and ∆C are the real GDP per capita growth and the real
consumption per capita growth, respectively. Correlations of ∆GDP and ∆C are calculated with
respect to the 14 country aggregates. For example, the row related to Vanuatu represents the
correlation of ∆GDP and ∆C growth of Vanuatu with the aggregate ∆GDP and ∆C. Means and
standard deviations (StD) are multiplied by 100. A&NZ stands for Australia and New Zealand.
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Table 2: Potential Welfare Gains from Risk Sharing among PICs
Welfare Gains
Australia 0.51
Fiji 4.32
French Polynesia 7.94
Kirbati 11.22
Marshall Islands 5.69
Micronesia 5.82
New Caledonia 8.95
New Zealand 1.31
Palau 13.02
Papua New Guinea 5.37
Samoa 4.05
Solomon Islands 5.48
Tongo 2.60
Vanuatu 6.14
Notes: Sample: 1981–2007. Table represents welfare gains in utility when each country
moves from financial autarky (each member consumes its own GDP) to perfect risk sharing
(where the consumption growth does not depend on GDP growth). The gain can be interpreted
as a permanent percentage increase in the country’s per capita consumption relative to its initial
consumption autarky.
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Table 3: Income and Consumption Smoothing by National Accounts Categories for
PICs
PICs with A&NZ
1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007 1981–2007
Factor Income (βf ) 0 5 1 4
(2) (6) (8) (2)
Depreciation (βd) –7 1 –1 –1
(2) (4) (6) (5)
Transfers (βτ ) –2 –4 4 3
(3) (3) (2) (1)
Saving (βs) 28 48 31 40
(12) (12) (11) (11)
Not Smoothed (βu) 80 52 65 57
(11) (17) (17) (10)
PICs without A&NZ
1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007 1981–2007
Factor Income (βf ) 7 7 8 6
(3) (4) (2) (4)
Depreciation (βd) –12 8 6 –1
(1) (8) (6) (7)
Transfers (βτ ) 9 8 11 9
(3) (4) (4) (4)
Saving (βs) 23 18 30 26
(13) (11) (15) (11)
Not Smoothed (βu) 73 59 49 60
(14) (18) (11) (18)
Notes: PICs includes Australia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Samoa, Tonga, and
Vanuatu. The rest of PICs are not included due to missing observations. A&NZ stands for
Australia and New Zealand. Two Step GLS method is used to solve the system of simultaneous
equations. First, we perform the OLS, then use the residuals to estimate the weights. Second,
weighted least squares is estimated using the estimated weights. The Prais-Winsten transforma-
tion is used to take care of the serial correlation of the variables. βf is the GLS estimate of the
slope in the regression of ∆ logGDPi−∆ logGNIi on ∆ logGDPi, βd is the slope in the regression
of ∆ logGNIi−∆ log NNIi on ∆ logGDPi, βτ is the slope in the regression of ∆ log NNIi−∆ log DNIi
on ∆ logGDPi and βs is the slope in the regression of ∆ log DNI
i −∆ log(Ci + Gi) on ∆ logGDPi.
βu is the coefficient in the regression of ∆ log(C
i + Gi) on ∆ logGDPi and it is the percentage
of shocks not smoothed. We interpret the rest of β-coefficients as the incremental percentage
amounts of income smoothing achieved at each level. Standard errors are in brackets.
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Table 4: Income and Consumption Smoothing by National Accounts Categories for
OECD members
1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007 1981–2007
Factor Income (βf ) −1 0 6 2
(1) (1) (3) (1)
Depreciation (βd) −9 −11 −7 −9
(1) (1) (1) (1)
Transfers (βτ ) 1 1 1 0
(1) (1) (1) (1)
Saving (βs) 56 58 64 58
(4) (5) (7) (4)
Not Smoothed (βu) 45 48 33 43
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Notes: OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK, and the US. Two Step GLS method is used to solve the system of si-
multaneous equations. First, we perform the OLS, then use the residuals to estimate the
weights. Second, weighted least squares is estimated using the estimated weights. The Prais-
Winsten transformation is used to take care of the serial correlation of the variables. βf is
the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ logGDPi − ∆ logGNIi on ∆ logGDPi, βd
is the slope in the regression of ∆ logGNIi − ∆ log NNIi on ∆ logGDPi, βτ is the slope in the
regression of ∆ log NNIi − ∆ log DNIi on ∆ logGDPi and βs is the slope in the regression of
∆ log DNIi−∆ log(Ci +Gi) on ∆ logGDPi. βu is the coefficient in the regression of ∆ log(Ci +Gi)
on ∆ logGDPi and it is the percentage of shocks not smoothed. We interpret the rest of β-
coefficients as the incremental percentage amounts of income smoothing achieved at each level.
Standard errors are in brackets.
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Table 5: Income Smoothing via Remittance Inflows and Foreign Aid for PICs with-
out A&NZ
1987–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007 1987–2007
NET REMITTANCES (βr) 2 –13 19 –2
(2) (5) (5) (3)
1987–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007 1987–2007
FOREIGN AID (βa) 16 18 3 13
(7) (6) (2) (5)
Notes: PICs includes Fiji, Kiribati, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon
Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu. The rest of PICs are not included due to lack of data. Two
Step GLS method is used. First, we perform the OLS, then use the residuals to estimate the
weights. Second, weighted least squares is estimated using the estimated weights. The Prais-
Winsten transformation is used to take care of the serial correlation of the variables. βr is the
GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ logGDPi−∆ log(GDP+NET REMITTANCES)i on
∆ logGDPi and it is the percentage of shocks smoothed via remittance inflows. βa is the GLS
estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ logGDPi−∆ log(GDP+ FOREIGN AID)i on ∆ logGDPi
and it is the percentage of shocks smoothed via foreign aid inflows. These two panel regressions
are solved separately. Standard errors are in brackets.
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